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Abstract
After over 60 years of research and development, AI
has made its way into mainstream business operations.
Continuous advances in the fields of machine learning,
knowledge representation, and logical reasoning are
expected to result in higher autonomy of AI-enabled
systems such as Distributed AI (DAI) agents that can
think and act. The increased agency of the AI systems is
expected to result in agency risks and the need for
mitigating such risks through AI governance. In this
paper, we build on agency theory and identify factors
that increase the risk of an agency problem between a
principal (a human or an organization) and an AI agent
and propose a framework for AI agency problem
analysis. The framework is illustrated through AI use
cases and industry examples. Implications for AI
governance research and practice are discussed.

1

Introduction

After over 60 years of research and development, AI
has made its way into mainstream business operations
as well as the personal life of unsuspecting individuals.
According to the McKinsey Global Institute, “it is
poised to cause the next wave of digital disruption” [1,
p. 6] and Gartner anticipates that by 2022, AI will
know more about the emotional state of an individual
than the people they are closest to. Over 60% of
personal device vendors will rely on third-party cloud
AI services [2]. At the enterprise level, innovations
such as RAGE-AI promise “zero-code, model-driven
software development using highly abstract
components, and traceable machine learning” [3, p. 5].
As more activities are transferred from human actors
and code-driven IT to model driven and ML based
solutions, organizations need to devise new types of
control mechanisms to ensure that the goals of the AI
artifacts are aligned with those of organizational
stakeholders. Gartner makes another prediction, this
time stating there will be a rise in the percentage of
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workers dedicated to monitoring and guiding neural
networks, a popular class of machine learning
algorithms [3]. Most commercial applications of AI
today are relatively narrow in scope. Image
recognition, natural language processing, predictive
models for geological exploration, and generative
models used for automatic translation are highly
dependent on their human handlers for data and
process input, along with model tuning. However, AI
artifacts are expected to become increasingly
autonomous, posing the risk of an agency problem for
users. Increased autonomy of AI-enabled artifacts calls
for the development of AI governance frameworks that
would help in the establishment of policies concerning
the development of AI, as well as the actions of AI
agents, and guide the monitoring of the proper
implementation of such policies.
Business Process Management is a diverse research
field that emerged at the inter-section of three process
management traditions, the quality control/scientific
management tradition, the strategic management
tradition, and the information technology tradition [4].
The managerial tradition within BPM research is
concerned with the alignment be-tween strategic goals
of an organization and its business processes [4]. As
managerial BPM research is directly concerned with
organizational governance issues [10], it is uniquely
positioned to tackle the issue of AI governance.
However, our understanding of how BPM can help
better manage the opportunities and challenges
presented by the introduction of advanced analytics
and AI into business operations is still in its nascent
form. We seek to identify ways in which BPM can
contribute to AI governance by adopting the agency
theory perspective [11]. Building on the agency theory,
we identify factors that increase the risk of the agency
problem in the organizational use of AI and develop a
framework for the AI agency problem analysis. Guided
by such a framework, we seek to identify AI
governance policies can contribute to reducing or
mitigating AI agency risks.
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Specifically, we seek to answer the following research
questions:
1. What factors increase the risk of the agency risks
in organizational use of AI?
2. How can BPM help address the AI agency risks?
In the next section, we provide a brief background on
AI, also known as Machine Intelligence, as well as the
key tenets of the agency theory. We then develop a
conceptual framework for analyzing agency risks
associated with the organizational use of AI and
illustrate it using industry examples and AI use case
vignettes. Next, we examine how various governance
policies can be helpful in addressing the AI agency
problem and identify roadblocks that need to be
addressed. Finally, implications for AI governance
researchers and practitioners are discussed.

2

Theory and background

2.1

The rise of Artificial Intelligence

The term artificial intelligence was coined in 1955
and the Turing test for artificial intelligence was
famously described in a 1950 publication [4], [5]. Since
then, the AI field has endured periods of fast progress
punctuated with periods of relative inactivity as the AI
community has not been able to meet the inflated
expectations of its stakeholders [6]. In the early 2000s,
a confluence of several technological trends led to an
exponential growth in AI capabilities.
Several
important milestones followed: the development of a
self-driving car, increased accuracy of the identification
of fraud in financial transactions, and the development
of AI algorithms capable of beating human contestants
in such games as Jeopardy, Go, and Poker [7, p. 9].
While most currently available AI systems are narrow
in scope and designed to excel in performing specific
tasks, significant progress in areas such as
representation learning, transfer learning, and
reinforcement learning is contributing to the
development of Artificial General Intelligence. For
example, while facial recognition is available today, the
Deep Learning algorithms can determine anyone’s
mood based on their facial expressions and actions.

2.2

Agency theory

Agency theory was developed as a means for
examining situations in which cooperating parties have
different goals or attitudes towards work or risk [8]. It
has since been applied to executive and employee
compensation, inter-firm contract design, and more.

[9]–[12]. At the core of the theory lies the relationship
between a principal (a party who delegates the work)
and an agent (a party who performs the work). Most
applications of agency theory are focused on resolving
the agency problem, which can arise “when (a) the
desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and
(b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify
what the agent is actually doing” [13, p. 58].
Governance can be generally defined as a set of
structures and processes put in place to mitigate the
agency problem within an organization or a process, e.g.
to ensure that actors performing specific activities do so
in such a way as to maximize goal attainment of
organizational stakeholders. Governance mechanisms
such as measurement of pre-defined metrics can help
reduce the agency problem in one of two ways: by
increasing goal alignment between the principal and the
agent, or by reducing information asymmetry, e.g.
making the agent’s actions transparent to the principal.
Agency theory suggests that certain governance
mechanisms and contractual arrangements help increase
goal alignment between a principal and an agent. In
addition, information systems and task characteristics
are proposed to moderate the effect of different
governance arrangements on the agency risks [13].
Governance mechanisms targeting goal alignment
include compensation contracts that tie agent pay to goal
attainment by the principal, e.g., stock options for
executives or bonuses for sales representatives.
Governance mechanisms targeting information
asymmetry include a means for limiting the agent’s
actions to those approved by the principal through the
process of formalization and automation. This also helps
increase the transparency of the agent’s actions through
management reporting, audit trails, and metric
measurement.

2.3

BPM and the Process View of the Firm

In general, BPM can be defined as an organizational
paradigm in which organizations are viewed as a
collection of processes and managerial challenges.
These are addressed through defining, analyzing,
implementing, and continuously improving such
processes. Within BPM, a process is defined as a
network of activities performed in parallel or in
sequence to achieve a desired outcome. In structured
processes, the flow of activities, their inputs and outputs
are well defined, described in organization-al policies
and procedures, and enforced through workflow
automation systems. However, well-structured
processes are easily imitable and thus cannot be a source
for competitive advantage [21], [22]. Unstructured
processes, such as product development or strategic
planning, are characterized by variability in the flow of
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activities, expected outputs and available inputs.
Moreover, the nature of work as well as re-sources
necessary for accomplishing it are not well understood
or purposefully kept ambiguous. Instead, organizations
rely on process participants to search for available (and
relevant) inputs and devise a way for converting such
inputs into the best possible output. Unstructured
processes are not easy to imitate and thus represent a
more reliable source of competitive advantage.
BPM
practitioners
distinguish
between
transactional, development, enabling, and governing
processes [4]. Transactional processes such as
production, purchasing, fulfillment, and payroll are
highly structured and support everyday business
operations. Development processes such as product
development and marketing are less structured and often
generate information that is referenced by transactional
processes, including product descriptions and prices,
marketing and recruitment materials, etc. Development
of human and IT resources is achieved through enabling
processes, whereas governing processes are concerned
with strategic planning, as well as risk and performance
management [4].
Although activities are the key building blocks of
processes, BPM is generally less concerned with how
activities are performed. Rather, it focusses on what the
inputs and outputs of such activities are, when the
activities are performed (the flow), and to some degree,
by whom they are performed (the actors) [23]. Activities
receive inputs from other activities within or outside the
process and convert them into output. Such outputs are
used as inputs into other activities inside or outside of
the process. Activities consume resources, which may
include labor, information, or physical resource.
However, the resources and their types are not well
defined within the BPM frame-work and the issue of
resource consumption is not fully addressed in BPM
research [24].
In BPM, actor/roles include human process
participants, computer information systems and
potentially organizational units. Actors typically
perform multiple activities and may be involved in
several processes, although a certain level of
specialization among actors is expected. Actors’ time is
viewed as a resource, and an actor cannot typically
perform two activities at the same time [24]. In
structured processes, actors have limited autonomy as
their actions are either completely predefined (as is the
case with code-based software or automated production
processes), or severely constrained by workflow
management systems. Unstructured processes are
characterized by high actor autonomy and high agency
risk. Therefore, actors’ compensation plans are devised
to ensure that they act in the best interests of the
organization [18].

3

Conceptual framework

3.1

Agency in AI

The concept of agency is central to the field of
Artificial Intelligence. In AI, an agent is defined as
“anything that can be viewed as perceiving its
environment through sensors and acting upon that
environment through actuators” [6]. An agent is rational
if it selects actions that optimize its performance
measure given available information. Information
available to an agent comes from two sources, the prior
knowledge provided to the agent by its designer and the
information received by the agent through its percepts.
A performance measure represents the key mechanism
through which the goals of the agent are defined in
relation to desirability of environmental states that result
from the agent’s actions.
An agent is considered autonomous to the extent it
can compensate for partial or incorrect prior knowledge
by learning from its actions and the percepts received
from the environment. Therefore, ability to learn from
its actions and from the data provided by its
environment is considered a critical part of AI
capability. Learning can be applied to different
components of an agent, including the ability to infer
relevant properties of the environment from percepts,
resulting in the agent’s own possible actions as well as
the utility of information describing the desirability of
world states [6, p. 694]. Consequently, machine learning
is considered a key component of AI research and
practice [1].
However, the ability to learn and the autonomy of an
agent is restricted by the variety and format of percepts
it can receive from its environment. The agent’s
autonomy is restricted to the extent to which it relies on
human actors or human-designed processes as sources
of information. As the agent gains the ability to accept
and learn from stimuli directly from the environment
through sensors or by means of computer vision or
natural language processing, its autonomy increases.

3.2

AI and the Agency Problem

As in other types of principal agent relationships,
agency risks in organizational use of AI stems from two
sources, differences between the principal’s and the
agent’s goals, and information asymmetries stemming
from the lack of transparency about the agent’s
operations. Therefore, in order to understand the AI
agency risks, it is important to define what the factors
are that influence the level of alignment between the
intelligent agent’s goals vs. the principal’s goals, and the
level of transparency of AI operations.
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Regarding AI and Goal Alignment, AI researchers
and practitioners generally believe that it is possible and
even necessary to assume that AI artifacts have goals.
Significant research in the AI field focuses specifically
on goal setting in AI [14], [15]. A rational AI agent will
act to achieve environmental states that optimize its
utility function. However, the agent’s specific goals, at
any point in time, are also influenced by its knowledge
about the contribution of different environmental states
to its utility function [6]. It is presumed that the ultimate
utility function is defined by the designer of the AI;
however, the contribution of different environmental
states to the utility function may be a part of the a priori
knowledge provided by the agent or by the designer or
learned through reinforcement learning. In addition,
agents typically have incomplete knowledge of
environmental states, and therefore its goals will be
influenced by its ability to infer the state of the
environment from its percepts, the use of artificial
inference. This ability is usually acquired by an agent
through the process of supervised, semi-supervised, and
unsupervised learning.
Assuming that the principal is an organization that
deploys an AI artifact, its goal can be expected to
optimize value for its stakeholders. Such a general goal
is usually translated into a series of more detailed
objectives that guide the performance of individual
organizational units or processes. AI artifacts can be
deployed within a particular business unit or business
process. Therefore, for the purpose of this discussion,
we will assume the principal’s goals to be the objectives
of the business unit or business process within which an
AI artifact is deployed. We will consider separate
situations when the same AI artifact is deployed in two
different processes that have different objectives.
Let us examine the goal setting process for an AI
artifact (the agent) in relation to the goals of a focal
business unit (the principal). It is logical to assume that
if an AI artifact is developed as a means to support the
focal process, its utility function will be aligned with the
process objectives. For example, a robot developed
specifically for supporting a specific production process
is expected to help optimize the objectives of that
process. Similarly, a predictive model developed by an
investment bank for identifying stock trading
opportunities is expected to maximize the objectives of
the process for which it is deployed, and presumably for
the benefits of the bank as a whole [16], [17]. It is
important to understand that to the extent to which an AI
artifact is capable of learning from the environment, it
is possible that its goals are distorted by exposure to
biased environmental stimuli. For example, a trading
algorithm trained on data from value stocks only is
likely to underperform when asked to trade growth
stocks or international securities. This introduces goal

volatility of AI artifacts that are based on online and
reinforcement learning algorithms.
It is also possible that an AI artifact is developed by
a third party and is deployed by a focal unit or process.
Industry reports suggest that investments in AI are
concentrated among a group of large technology
companies and start-ups specializing in AI [1]. Such
companies have access to the top AI talent and
technology expertise. In addition, many such companies
also have access to large volumes of data they collect as
a by-product of providing their services; along with the
purchase of data from data append providers such as
Experian, Acxiom, and the Weather Company. They
leverage such data for AI training [18], [19]. Therefore,
it is likely that a large share of AI artifacts will be
developed by these AI leaders, and deployed by other
organizations in their business processes [20]. In these
cases, it is logical to expect that the utility function of
AI artifacts will be set up in such a way as to maximize
the value for the company.
To the extent to which the AI developer is deriving
value from the sale of the AI artifact, such artifacts will
seek to maximize the value for its users. For example, a
corporation selling large-scale AI applications to its
corporate clients is expected to ensure that such
applications deliver value for such clients. This is
usually achieved by re-training a pre-trained model with
tailored client data. This approach is referred to as
transfer learning [21]. Organizational research on the
agency suggests that the efforts of the AI developer to
customize the AI artifact to the needs of the deploying
company will be influenced by the presence of
competition from other AI providers, outcome controls
on the part of the client, and other factors.
On the other hand, a seller of consumer-focused AI
artifacts, such as Amazon Echo or Google Home, is
likely to configure the utility function of such devices in
a way that maximizes the value of the provider as well
as the consumer. One common way in which AI
providers derive value is by collecting data from AI
users to further train the AI platform [18]. One could
expect that once such consumer data becomes less
valuable [19], other AI providers will seek other sources
of value such as using their AI to promote third party
products and services to consumers. Therefore, one may
expect goal alignment to be the lowest in the case of
consumer or off-the-shelf AI.
In summary, the level of goal alignment between the
principal (an organizational process) and the agent (an
AI artifact) is expected to vary depending on a variety
of factors. These include whether or not an AI artifact
was built by the deploying organization or by a third
party, along with the nature of contractual arrangements
between the AI provider and the deploying organization.
It will also be influenced by whether the artifact was
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developed for the specific process or for a generic class
of problems, and by the data used for the training of the
artifact (see Figure 1).

Moderate
agency problem

Low agency
problem

•Low goal
alignment
•High operational
transparency

•High goal
alignment
•High operational
transparency

High agency
problem

Moderate
agency problem

•Low goal
alignment
•Low operational
transparency

•High goal
alignment
•Low operational
transparency

3.2.1. Transparency in AI operations. Concerns about
the lack of transparency of AI operations lie at the center
of the discourse about the threat of AI [22]–[24]. The
lack of transparency can be attributed to three factors:
(1) computational algorithms and models that are
difficult to understand/interpret especially as they
become less stable and more adaptable, (2) lack of
transparency regarding data sources for AI, especially
as AI becomes capable of receiving data directly from
the environment, and (3) the sheer speed and
computational capacity of AI artifacts make their
operations virtually impossible to audit.
Traditional software algorithms are designed to
implement the rules devised by humans. In contrast,
model-based software is expected to derive its rules
from the data it is given. Conceptually, data driven rules
are not new. Complex statistical models have long been
the basis of many business and engineering applications.
However, until recently, the models used in practice
such as decision trees, linear and logistic regression,
SVM models and case-based learning algorithms, have
been amenable to human interpretation. Decision trees
are the easiest to interpret in terms of business rules.
Therefore, they have been heavily used in processes that
require a high level of transparency due to regulatory
considerations. Interpretation of regression models
requires more extensive background knowledge, but is
still rather straightforward. In comparison, advanced
ML algorithms present a significant challenge in terms
of interpretation. From ensemble models, to neural

networks, the interpretability of the decision algorithms
becomes more difficult. In addition, deep neural
network models are nearly impossible to interpret,
hence the creation of the Explainable AI (XAI) in the
LIME project (Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic
Explanations). Moreover, advanced AI is expected to
rely on pipelines of models that are consecutively
applied to data inputs, thus ensuring that such models
represent a complete black box for its user. Complex AI
models deliver superior predictive performance, and
thus are expected to be adopted by organizations
seeking to maximize return on investments. Yet, black
box models and algorithms also significantly increase
the risk of the agency problem.
The second key factor that leads to the decrease in
the transparency of AI operations is the ability of AI to
gather data directly from the environment, without
human mediation. This ability is fostered by two trends.
The first one is the proliferation of IoT devices which
collect data through a series of sensors and share such
data with other devices in the network [2]. As research
in multi-agent negotiations advances, AI artifacts are
expected to be able to broker agreements with other
devices to access their data. Such agreements are likely
to be numerous, expressed in computer code, and too
costly for continuous human oversight. This will lead
human actors to gradually relinquishing control over
data access and sharing to AI. The second trend,
continuous progress in representation learning,
including image, video and speech recognition leads to
increasing adoption of AI for data input into business
processes, and for its use in pattern discovery in diverse
unstructured data [21].
In summary, transparency of AI operations is
influenced by several factors, including the learning and
decision-making algorithms that are embedded into the
AI artifacts, the complexity of the AI artifacts, the
information gathering abilities of the artifacts, as well as
by the system of explanations incorporated into the
artifacts.
3.2.2. Analyzing AI agency risk. Combining the two
factors, the risk for an agency problem increases as the
levels of both operational transparency and goal
alignment decrease. The agency problem is the lowest
in situations where isolated ML solutions based on
easily interpretable algorithms, such as decision trees or
logistic regression, are developed in house for a specific
process task. The agency problem increases as the AI
solutions become more sophisticated, combine multiple
deep learning algorithms and are able to receive data
directly from the environment. Highly sophisticated AI
algorithms pose an agency risk even when they are
developed in-house. Such risks may stem from a poorly
defined utility function or from AI learning undesirable
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behavior from erroneous or biased data as referenced by
Cathy O’Neil at a recent TED Talk on introducing
human
bias
into
objective
algorithms
(https://www.ted.com/speakers/cathy_o_neil).
The
agency problem increases as an organization outsources
the development of AI artifacts to third parties thus
relinquishing control over the utility function and the
training data. To the extent that the sourced AI is
relatively simple, the agency problem can be mitigated
through the analysis of the underlying decision models,
or through output control as in the case with simple
image and speech recognition applications.

3.3

they were shopping. The ML/DL algorithms were
trained on the images and classified customers into
segments, such as a vacation vs. business customer.
Based on their segment, specific marketing messages
and selling routines were instituted to increase sales at
each store. The pilot project was implemented in ten
stores at an investment cost of $200K per store. The
average increase in stores sales is $300K per year. They
are now rolling this out to all airport store locations.
Again, the relative transparency of the AI operation (it
is used to segment customers into vacation and
business) helps ensure that the AI is used in the best
interests of the business owners.

Applying AI agency framework to
industry cases

Case 1. Anti-Money Laundering and Fraud is a
significant challenge for many financial institutions,
with losses amounting to millions of dollars every year.
The industry standard software and methods in use
today support the development of rules-based systems
to catching fraudsters. Business users in financial
institutions must think about what type of fraudulent
transaction could take place or have happened in the
past. They then create training data sets by identifying
such types of events in historical data, and using
analytics software to help develop business rules for
identifying potential fraudulent transactions based on
past events. These rules are then deployed to screening
real-time transactions. Another approach would be to
allow the machine to sift through the data and look for
patterns in transactions in real time. The upside of this
would be that relevant patterns not known before and
not always detected by humans, can be identified and
rules can be modified dynamically to account for such
patterns. Notably, this would reduce AI operational
transparency and heighten AI agency risk.
Case 2. Is it really you withdrawing money at the
ATM? Deep Learning models executed on IBM’s
PowerAI platform were used in banks in China and the
U.K. to take ATM camera data, analyze it in real time
and determine if the user was covering up their face. If
the algorithm inferred an issue, the ATM would
immediately shut down and stop all transactions, along
with contacting the authorities. ATM crimes of this
nature have been significantly reduced. The case
involves the use of a third-party AI platform. However,
the agency risk is mitigated by the relative transparency
of how the AI artifact is used in a business process. Such
transparency allows banks to adjust the use of the
algorithm for locations/seasons when partial face
coverage is common, as in the middle of the winter in
Siberia.
Case 3. A very large airport store with multiple
locations used IoT video to analyze its customers while

3.4

Addressing AI agency risks through
process management

Both application and development of AI are embedded
in organizational process, and therefore, BPM methods
can be used to identify, reduce or mitigate the AI agency
risks. We propose that BPM approaches can contribute
to addressing the AI agency risks through (1) explicit
modeling of activities performed by AI, (2) explicit
modeling of activities associated with development and
training of AI, and (3) explicit modeling of the links
between AI development/training and AI application
activities.
3.4.1. Managing the use of AI in business processes.
In spite of their resemblance of a system-based activity,
an AI artifact is best conceptualized as an actor. In such
capacity, it can be deployed by structured or
unstructured processes. For example, image or speech
recognition are routinely used in transactional processes
including sales and payment processing or production.
Increasingly, sophisticated AI is used in unstructured
processes, from stock trading to R&D [1], [17]. In such
processes, AI may be used as a tool for assisting human
actors, or as an autonomous agent. However, the
distinction between the two is rather diluted, as human
actors may become complacent and delegate most
decisions and responsibilities to AI artifacts.
The AI agency risks increase as more activities
within a process are performed by AI and thus there is
less opportunity for human actors to observe the outputs
of such activities and exert outcome control. The agency
theory suggests that in the absence of operational
transparency, organizations are expected to impose
stricter outcome controls on AI-heavy processes.
However, this would require management to be aware
of which processes rely on AI and to what extent. The
lack of specialized notations for model-based or AIbased activities makes visualization of AI presence in a
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process challenging. Another challenge comes from the
fact that AI components are often incorporated into
larger third-party software applications. Yet, as the
number of such components increases, tracing the use of
AI is the critical step in mitigating the agency risks
presented by AI.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the
following:
Proposition 1A: Explicit modeling of AI
components in process maps is associated with a more
accurate assessment of AI agency risks.
Proposition 1B: Explicit modeling of AI
components in process maps is associated with adoption
of more strict AI governance mechanisms.
3.4.2. Managing AI development and training. Like
other actors, human or technology based, AI artifacts
evolve over time. Within organizations, the evolution of
actors is managed through dedicated business processes,
including human resource development and IT
development processes. Simple AI artifacts with limited
learning capabilities are similar to IT and other
technological assets that are designed and developed by
humans. However, the design of AI artifacts is not based
on the opinions of expert designers but on data.
Therefore, in representing and managing AI
development processes, special attention needs to be
paid to training data, its sources and the governance
procedures involved in data selection and validation.
Therefore, it is recommended that processes focused on
the development of AI and advanced analytics modeling
be designed and managed separately from other IT
development processes. Similarly, in the case of third
party AI, AI acquisition processes may need to include
activities not typically included in traditional IT
acquisition processes, such as an audit of data sources
used for AI training and AI retraining using evolving
organizational data.
As AI artifacts develop an increased capacity for
continuous and independent learning, AI development
and acquisition processes become similar to those used
for the management of human resources. Although
organizations invest significant resources in training,
such training is only partially responsible for the
knowledge and skills possessed by their employees.
Depending on the position, employees are hired and
compensated for their knowledge and skills acquired
through their formal and informal education, as well
their work experience. Furthermore, employees learn on
their jobs and potentially become more valuable to their
future employers. In a similar manner, sophisticated AI
artifacts are expected to come with pre-existing skills,
be trained for a specific job, and be able to learn on the
job. Depending on the AI ownership, AI artifacts may
also be able to switch employers (in case of third party

AI), and their value is expected to increase with their
experience. Like employees, AI artifacts are capable of
transferring knowledge within and outside of the
organization. Therefore, over time, AI development
processes need to include such activities as “resume”
checking, onboarding, and making arrangements for
non-disclosure of information. Special attention in such
processes should be devoted to continuous efforts to
maintain goal alignment through performance
measurement and intentional retraining.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the
following:
Proposition 2A: Organizations with specialized AI
development and governance processes are more
successful in accurately assessing AI agency risk than
organizations that rely on traditional IT development
and governance processes.
Proposition 2B: Organizations with specialized AI
development and governance processes are more
successful in mitigating AI agency risk than
organizations that rely on traditional IT development
and governance processes.
3.4.3. Managing autonomous AI learning. In a
traditional approach to business analytics and AI
development, AI training is a part of development
processes and the trained AI artifact is deployed in a
transactional or development process. Data from such
processes is then fed back to the development process
for future retraining and re-deployment of the AI
artifact. In such situations, attention needs to be paid to
accurately representing the linkages between
development and deployment processes, especially as
multiple AI artifacts may be involved and their retraining needs to be coordinated. As AI’s ability for
independent learning grows, it becomes increasingly
critical to trace the environments to which an AI artifact
is exposed, and to be able to revert to a pre-exposure
state of an artifact if the exposure results in being
detrimental to the performance of the artifact.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the
following:
Proposition 3A: Ability to trace AI artifact learning
through exposure to training data and training
environments is associated with a more accurate
assessment of AI agency risks.
Proposition 3B: Ability to trace AI artifact learning
through exposure to training data and training
environments is associated with adoption of stricter AI
and data governance mechanisms.
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4

Discussion

The growth in AI capabilities and their increased
deployment in organizational business processes
presents opportunities for increased process efficiency
and effectiveness. It also creates AI agency risks that
need to be mitigated through appropriate AI governance
mechanisms.
First, there is a need for theoretical and empirical
research of organizational policies as they relate to AI
use and governance, as well as on organizational
adoption of AI governance mechanisms. While some of
the AI governance policies may apply to all
organizational processes, some other policies are
expected to apply to some, but not other processes.
Regulatory environment is expected to have a
significant impact on adoption of AI governance
policies. However, understanding how inherent process
characteristics are related to AI use and AI governance
for that process is a fruitful direction for IS research.
Second, there is a need for the development of
process modeling standards that would support AI
governance. Considering the critical role of data in AI
development and training, it is important to represent
which process data is used for AI training. It addition,
increasing transparency of AI operations calls for
explicit notations for activities that rely on machine
learning and AI. Finally, there is a need for developing
standard processes of AI development, acquisition, and
governance that would take into account the unique
aspects of AI. IS researchers and practitioners can play
an important role in developing and evaluating such
standards.

5

Conclusion

Increase in the autonomy of AI-enabled systems
creates AI agency risks. In this paper, we applied agency
theory and proposed a framework for the analysis of AI
agency risks. The framework suggests that AI agency
risks increase as the transparency of AI operations
decreases and as the goal alignment between AI and the
AI agent decreases (as is the case with third party AI).
We further examined how BPM concepts can be applied
to analyzing and mitigating AI agency problem.
The paper contributes to the IS research as it
highlights the risks associated with AI assimilation
within organizational processes and points towards
fruitful directions for future research. Such directions
include research on AI use and governance in business
processes, development of process modeling standards
for dealing with AI-enabled activities, and development
of industry best practices for AI development,
acquisition and governance processes.
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